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When a regulated firm considers undertaking an effort to innovate, it of-
ten faces incentives quite different from those confronting an unregulated
firm. At least three types of uncertainty arise. First, will an innovative effort
result in an implementable technology, and if so, when? Second, will the im-
plementation of the technology be delayed by a regulatory authority, and if
so, for how long? And finally, when the regulator permits the use of an inno-
vation, what level of benefits will the firm ultimately receive?
The first question is not unique to regulation. The extensive literature de-
voted to this issue has been summarized by Kamien and Schwartz.' In the
past decade a number of theoretical efforts have shown how the structure of
industrial markets, the rate of technological progress in those markets, and
the incentives for a firm to innovate are affected by uncertainty about the
time required for an effort to innovate to reach technological fruition.2
Virtually all of the theoretical studies on research and development (R&D)
have focused on unregulated markets, the most notable exception being a
study by Klevorick. 3 Klevorick examined the effects of stochastic regulatory
review on the innovative effort undertaken by a regulated firm, and charac-
terized the optimal policy of a firm facing the prospect of regulatory lag. He
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emphasized the effects of changes in the length of regulatory lag, and in the
probability that a firm will undergo regulatory review. This work differs from
his in that we focus on the uncertainty of the length of the delay between the
time of innovation and the time at which a firm receives permission to adopt
the innovation.
A number of studies have addressed innovation in regulated industries,
but these have been primarily of a descriptive or empirical nature. The em-
pirical investigations have attempted to measure the rate of technological
progress in regulated industries. For example, Kendrick has estimated the av-
erage annual rate of total factor productivity (output per unit of capital and
labor, combined) for transportation industries to have been about 3.2 percent
between 1899 and 1953. For railroads alone, the corresponding estimate was
2.5 percent. These figures compare with an estimate for the aggregated pri-
vate domestic economy of about 1.7 percent over the same time period.
4
Mansfield has estimated that output per man-hour in the railroad industry
rose at an annual rate of 2.5 percent between 1890 and 1925, and at 3.0 per-
cent between 1925 and 1953.'
These figures alone do not provide a basis for determining whether the
transportation industry has performed well or poorly in innovation. Fried-
laender emphasizes this by pointing out that "there is no operational standard
against which performance can be judged. ' 6 The figures do not reflect the
extent to which potential opportunities for innovation in the industry were
exploited, a point that makes the comparison of innovation rates across indus-
tries even more difficult.
7
Instead of addressing the aggregate rate of innovation for an entire indus-
try, we direct our analysis to the firm itself. We specify a model of a regulated
firm that faces all three types of uncertainty described at the outset of this pa-
per. We focus on the incentives created by regulatory delay, and in particular,
on the uncertainty introduced by the regulatory process. It is this focus that
differentiates this work from most other studies of research and development.
Material from selected case studies in surface freight transport will be used to
shape and illustrate the analysis.
We will first examine some widely held views about innovation and regula-
tion and show why efforts to innovate are diminished for higher discount
rates, higher costs of participating in the regulatory process, and longer
regulatory delays. We will also show why uncertainty about the level of bene-
4. J. KENDRICK, PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 136--37 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Number 71 General Series, 1961).
5. Mansfield, Innovation and Technical Change in the Railroad Industry, in TRANSPORTATION
ics 171 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965).
6. A. FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION 88 (The Brookings
Institution, 1969) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDLAENDER].
7. Id. at 88-89.
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fits ultimately to be received may not affect the level of R&D effort for at
least some firms. And finally, we will show why a regulated firm may actually
prefer to face uncertainty about the length of regulatory delay, and choose to
engage in more R&D under uncertainty than it would if the regulatory delay
were known in advance.
II
EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY DELAY
Before formulating a model of innovation with regulatory delay, it would
be useful to consider a few examples that illustrate the nature of the dilemma
that transport firms face when deciding whether to engage in R&D. If regula-
tors delay the innovation implementation, then there can be no doubt that in-
centives to innovate are dampened. Briefly, we examine two specific innova-
tions, the Big John Hopper railroad car for shipping grain and the unit train.
A. "Big John Hopper"
During the late 1950s grain shipments to the Southeast grew rapidly. Most
of the increased shipments were made by barges or by motor carriers rather
than by railroads.' The Southern Railway System designed a large aluminum
"Big John Hopper" car to transport grain at a lower cost, and attempted to
use the innovation to justify lower tariffs for its grain shipments. Southern
proposed new tariffs for grain shipments that were, on average, 60 percent
below the existing tariffs. Without regulatory delay, the tariffs would have be-
come effective in August 1961.'
Not surprisingly, the barge shippers objected to the new tariff.' ° After nu-
merous delays, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) finally decided to
disallow the lower tariffs on July 1, 1963, on the grounds that the proposed
lower tariffs would violate the National Transportation Policy (NTP) causing
unfair and destructive competition." On appeal, a district court set aside the
ICC decision in 1964, based on the lack of substantial evidence in the record
to support the ICC decision.' 2 The Supreme Court later vacated the decision
of the district court and remanded the case to the ICC for reconsideration. 13
In August 1965, the ICC approved the lower tariffs, four years after South-
ern announced its intention to introduce the "Big John Hopper."1 4
8. For a good discussion of the market conditions at the time of the Big John Hopper innova-
tion, see Barber, Technological Change in American Transportation: The Role of Government Action, 50
VA.L.REV. 824, 863 (1964).
9. Gellman, Surface Freight Transportation, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUS-
TRIES 166, 175 (W. Capron ed., The Brookings Institution, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Gellman].
10. 321 I.C.C. 582-83 (1963).
11. Id. at 582.
12. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
13. 379 U.S. 642 (1965).
14. 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965).
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B. The Unit Train
Railroad costs are reduced when large amounts of a single commodity can
be consolidated for movement on a single shipment. A train movement used
to haul only one commodity, for example, coal transported from a mine to a
utility, will require less switching in transit, and overall lower costs.
Unit train movements were used by the federal government as early as
World War I, "5 but they were not widely adopted by the railroads until much
later. MacAvoy and Sloss have argued persuasively that ICC regulation de-
layed the adoption of the innovation because of rate restrictions placed on
commodities.' 6 In particular, the ICC restrictions would have required that a
lower rate filed for unit train movements be applied to any shipper using sim-
ilar services. Thus, "unless the savings on the innovation, in this case the unit
trains, are sufficiently great to offset the revenue reductions on the traffic
that currently moves at higher rates, the innovation will not be adopted."' 7
In the case of unit trains, the regulatory restriction on tariffs effectively re-
duced the expected benefit from the innovation. As we shall show in Section
IV, this has the consequence of deterring the rate of expenditures on devel-
oping better unit train technology.
These examples are not presented for the purpose of examining the mer-
its of the arguments involved. Rather, they illustrate the powerful effects of
the regulatory process in determining the level of benefit ultimately accruing
to an innovator, in introducing uncertainty about the level of benefits, and in
causing regulatory delay of uncertain length to be a part of the environment
within which a firm must make its decision whether to engage in R&D. Nu-
merous other examples of regulatory effects on innovation could be cited to
illustrate similar points.18 These considerations help to shape the model of in-
novation and regulation to which we now turn.
III
A MODEL OF INNOVATION AND REGULATORY DELAY
Consider a regulated firm that is deciding whether to undertake innova-
tion, and that faces all three kinds of uncertainty described in Section I of
this paper. We shall assume that if the firm elects to undertake the project, it
enters into a fixed cost R&D contract.1" Let us denote the present value of the
15. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 6, at 94.
16. P. MAcAvoy & J. SLOSS, REGULATION OF TRANSPORT INNOVATION 59-85 (1967).
17. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 6, at 94.
18. For example, the ICC costing procedures may have affected the timing of the introduc-
tion of railroad piggybacking (trailer on flat car) operations. For a good discussion of this, see
Gellman, supra note 9, at 170-74.
19. The term fixed cost means that the level of the costs incurred does not vary with the time
until the innovation is actually achieved. This is the form of R&D costs investigated by Loury. See
Loury, supra note 2. Of course, other forms of R&D costs are possible. For example, Lee & Wilde,
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cost of the R&D effort as being "x" dollars, where the level of x is chosen by
the firm.2 0 This money will be spent whether or not the project results in an
actual innovation, and independently of whether regulators ultimately allow
implementation of the innovation.
Given the decision to spend x dollars on R&D, there is uncertainty about
the arrival time of a technologically feasible design. Although the firm does
not know exactly when the innovation will occur, it does assign some probabil-
ity that the innovation will occur before any given time, which we denote t1 ,
when the size of its R&D program is x dollars.2 ' Moreover, the firm believes
that by increasing x, it can increase the probability that the innovation will
arrive by a specified time. 22
Once the innovation is developed, the firm may have to seek regulatory
approval in order to implement the innovation, particularly if the firm seeks
changes in tariffs or operating authority as a result of the innovation. Of
course, not all innovations will require regulatory approval prior to imple-
mentation, particularly those that do not present a problem with safety, pose
a threat to other firms' profits, or require tariff adjustments for the
innovating firm. Since regulatory delay is not an issue, these innovations do
not concern us.
However, two further uncertainties arise when regulatory action is re-
quired. The first is the uncertainty about the length of the delay, which we
denote t_. Thus, the total time from the initiation of the R&D effort until ac-
tidal implementation will be ( 1 +t 2 ), where implementation does not occur un-
til the regulatory delay is completed. 2 The length of t2 to some extent de-
pends on the resistance that the innovator will encounter during the delay.
see note 2 supra, have investigated the case in which the firm incurs both some fixed cost (whose
level does not vary with time until innovation is actually achieved) and a variable cost (which adds
to the fixed cost an additional cost per time period until innovation arrives).
20. The actual payment of' the costs of the R&D project could be for x dollars in full at the
outset of the project. Or, it may be incurred at some later time, t, in an amount of y dollars. If r
is the nominal interest rate paid continuously, then the y dollars paid at time t have a present
value of x dollars when x = ye ", where e is approximately equal to 2.71828. See A. CHIANG,
FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 293-94, 456-59 (2d ed. 1974).
21. Let f(t,, x) represent the probability density function for the arrival time, t1, given an R&D
expenditure level of x. Then F(t,,x) is the corresponding cumulative density function, which
states the probability that the innovation will arrive by time t1, given x.
22. This statement is equivalent to the condition that F(t1,x) increases as x increases. In other
words, the partial derivative of F(t,,x) with respect to x is positive. For the balance of this paper
we will denote the partial derivative of one variable with respect to a second variable by
subscribing the first with the second. Thus the partial derivative of F(t,,x) with respect to x is rep-
resented by F,(t,,x).
23. In some cases the innovation may actually be introduced (to some extent) before the
regulatory action is concluded. For example, in the Big John Hopper case, Southern had placed
some of the grain cars in service, and at some lower tariffs, during the delay. But the full benefits
of the innovation were far from being realized during this time. See Gellman, supra note 9, at
177. The qualitative results of the effects of regulatory delay on innovation, which we develop be-
low, would hold even if some (but not all) benefits are realized before the delay is over.
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We denote the extent of this resistance, R. For example, R might be thought
of as the extent of rivalry from intermodal competitors, whose market shares
might decline if the innovation is adopted at tariffs proposed by the innova-
tor. As mentioned earlier, when Southern decided to develop the Big John
Hopper, it encountered much resistance from the barges and other shippers.
Thus, qualitatively, R was large in that case.
Given the resistance, R, there remains uncertainty about the length of the
delay, t2 . Although the firm does not know exactly when the delay will end, it
does assign some probability that the delay will be shorter than any given du-
ration (e.g., t2 ). 24 Moreover, the firm believes that a higher level of resistance,
R, will reduce the probability that the regulatory delay will end by any
specified time."
Finally, there is uncertainty about the extent to which the firm will benefit
from the innovation. For example, if the innovation reduces the cost of pro-
viding a service subject to intermodal competition, the firm does not know in
advance what will ultimately be the tariff in effect for its own service, for the
services provided by its rivals, or the exact amount the cost reduction actually
achieved. We assume that the level of additional profits accruing to the firm
after t 2 will be a flow of b dollars. Although b is uncertain, we assume that the
firm can assign some probability that the level of benefits will be less than any
particular level (e.g., bl), given the level of resistance, R.2 6
Although an R change may affect the probability of receiving at least b,
dollars, the directional effect is not obvious. On one hand, with intense ri-
valry, an innovator may encounter stronger arguments against the tariffs and
other conditions of service it proposes following an innovation. Expected ben-
efits might decline as rivalry increases. On the other hand, a firm facing vig-
orous rivalry might expect to capture large shares of the market from its com-
petitors if an innovation is successful. Expected benefits might increase with
more rivalry.
2 7
We assume that the firm selects the level of R&D expenditures, x, to
maximize T, the present value of the expected profits resulting from the ef-
fort to innovate, where the discount rate for the firm is r. 28 There are three
24. Let g(t 2,R) represent the probability density function for the length of regulatory delay,
given R. Then G(t 2,R) is the corresponding cumulative density function, which states the proba-
bility that the delay will be shorter than t2, given R.
25. This statement is equivalent to the condition that G(t 2,R) declines as R increases, or, fol-
lowing the notation of note 22, supra, GR(t2,R)<O.
26. Let h(b,R) represent the probability density function for the level of benefits, b, given R.
Then H(b,R) is the corresponding cumulative density function, which states the probability that
the level of benefit will be no more than b dollars given R.
27. This statement is equivalent to the condition that H(b,R) may rise or fall as R increases,
or, following the notation of note 22, supra, HR(b,R) has no determinate sign.
28. The notion of present value is discussed in note 20, supra. By working with expected prof-
its, we are assuming that the firm is risk neutral rather than risk averse or risk loving. See H.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMic ANALYSIS 108-09 (1978) [hereinafter cited as VARIAN]. Suppose the firm
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components that when added together, comprise T. First, as stated earlier,
the present value of the cost of the R&D project is x. 2 9 Second, between t,
when the innovation arrives, and (t1 +t 2 ), when the regulatory delay is con-
cluded, the firm is involved in legal proceedings before the regulator, and
perhaps the court system. We assume that the firm incurs a procedural cost
flow of L dollars to maintain a "standard" level of effort in those proceedings.
(We do not specify the level of effort as a decision variable for the firm; this
possibility suggests an interesting extension of the present analysis.) Thus the
present value of these procedural expenditures incurred between t, and (t, +
t2 ) constitutes the second component of T.1°
The third component of T is the present value of the benefit flow. We as-
sume that benefits, b, are received forever after time (t 1 +t 2 ). 3 ' Finally, the
firm determines T by adding all three components, and by taking the expec-
tation of the sum over all of the possible values of the uncertain variables t,
t2 , and b. 32 The firm then chooses the level of x that maximizes T.
33
could accept a lottery which would give it w dollars with probability p, and y dollars with proba-
bility (1-p). If the firm is indifferent to accepting the lottery and accepting [pw + (1-p)yl dollars
with certainty, then it is risk neutral. If it prefers the former, it is risk loving; if it prefers the lat-
ter, it is risk averse.
29. See note 20, supra. Since it is a cost, its contribution to T is -x.




31. The expected present value of the benefit stream is
J 'be- tdt
+ t, (2)
32. Formally, the present value of the expected profits from the innovation can be written as
tI + t 2
T(x,R,r,L) = -x + - { L) e rdt (3)
0 0 t1
+ bh(hR)db]e dt} f(tl,x)g(t 2,R)dtldt 2
ti - t 2  -
L + b (R) f e f(t 1,x)dt, e-'2 g(t 2,R)dt 2
x rf
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IV
EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN DISCOUNT RATE, PROCEDURAL COST, AND THE
EXTENT OF INTERMODAL COMPETITION ON INNOVATION
Three observations can be stated immediately about innovation incentives
for the regulated firm. These do not deal with uncertainty, a topic we reserve
for Section V. We begin by asking how a change in the discount rate would
affect the innovation level.3 4
Proposition 1. A higher discount rate reduces the amount of innova-
tion undertaken by the firm. This effect is observed even in the ab-
sence of regulatory delay (i.e., when t2 = 0)-"
_ L__ e-11, f(t,,x)dt,
0





G(R) bh(b,R)db, the mean of h(b,R) given R. (4)
33. The first order necessary condition for an optimum at which x > 0 is:
T - I + (L + b(R)) J e-", F,(,x)dt
,  
e-2 g(t 2,R)dt 2  (5)
0 0
-L / e -11 F,(t,,x)dt, = 0.
0
Further, define $,,(x) to be J em', Fx(t1 ,x)dt. Then from equation (5), we have
0
0(x) = I/{[L + b(R)] e-'2 g(t 2,R)dt, - L} > 0 (6)
0
Finally, at a maximum of T, then T_ < 0, which implies that 0,.(x) < 0. For a discussion of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for optimality, see VARIAN, supra note 28 at 262-67.
34. For a discussion of the discount rate, see note 20 supra.
35. Proof: From equations (5) and (6), supra note 33, it follows that
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The rationale for this statement is straightforward. The presence of a dis-
count factor means that the firm weighs a dollar received (or spent) earlier in
the stream of time more heavily than a dollar received (or spent) later on.
Since the firm incurs research & development and procedural costs before it
receives benefits, a higher discount rate makes innovation less attractive.
One might expect that a higher procedural cost, L, leads to less innova-
tion. Higher procedural costs make any prospective innovation less profitable
if that innovation is subject to regulatory delays. Proposition 2 shows that this
is true.
Proposition 2. An increase in procedural cost, L, leads to lower level
innovation by the firm.
3 6
We now turn to the effect of increased rivalry. Increased rivalry affects the
innovation incentives in two ways. First, intense intermodal competition typi-
cally lengthens regulatory delay. Second, it may either increase or reduce the
benefits level, b, ultimately realized by the innovator, as noted earlier. The
two effects combined make the effects of increased intermodal competition on
the rate of innovation ambiguous.
Proposition 3. Increased intermodal competition (rivalry) will decrease
the level of innovative effort if the probability of receiving at least b,
dollars of net benefits remains constant or falls as competition be-
comes more intense (R rises) for any b. Otherwise, the level of inno-
vative effort may either rise or fall as intermodal competition be-
comes more intense.3
7
T = -it,J em, F,(t.,x)dt, [(L + 6(R)) e_2 g(t2 ,R)dt 2 - L]
100
-t 2 (L + b(R))Je_2 F(tx)dtJ e s g(t2,R)dt&2 < 0
-0 1.'
Thus dx/dr -T_ /, < 0, even if t 2 = 0. For a-discussion of comparative statics, used to prove
this and subsequent propositions, see VARIAN, supra note 28 at 267-69.
36. Proof: From equation (5), supra note 33, and the fact that
Jo" e M2 g(t 2,R)dt 2 < 1 when there is any possibility of regulatory delay, it follows that
T.L = e-"1 F1(t,,x)dt 1[1 e-2 g(t2,R)dt2- 1] < 0
Thus dx/dL = -T.L/T_ < 0.
37. We may rewrite equation (5), supra note 32, using the fact that
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Increased intermodal competition can be expected to lengthen regulatory de-
lay. If it also lowers expected benefits, then innovation looks less attractive to
the firm. However, if it raises expected benefits, then the firm expects higher
benefits at a later time, and the present value of the innovation (and the in-
centive to innovate) may either rise or fall in that case.
V
EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON THE EFFORT TO INNOVATE
In this Section we will examine how uncertainty about the level of benefits
and the extent of regulatory delay affect the firm. We ask whether a firm
facing uncertainty about the length of regulatory delay and the ultimate flow
of benefits would change its level of innovative effort if advance (certain)
knowledge was available about what the delay and benefit flow would be. We
note that the term "certain" is imprecise. The choice of an appropriate mean-
ing is not obvious. We employ the following notions in the work that follows.
Definition 1. "Certainty about the level of benefit flow" denotes the
case in which the firm knows in advance that the flow of benefits will
be equal to the mean of the probability distribution for b, b(R). 38
Definition 2. "Certainty about the length of regulatory delay" denotes
the case in which the firm knows in advance that the actual delay will
be the mean of the probability distribution for t2, t2 (R). 3 9
Then, the following two statements can be made. 40
e-JC 2 g(t2 ,R)dt 2 = e-rt2 G(t,R)dt2
It follows that
T.R - rb(R)J e- F.(t,,)dt1 e-'2 G(t 2,R)dt 2
0
+ r(L+b(R)) e- ' Fx(tj,x)dtj / e-M2 GR(t 2,R)dt 2 < 0.
0 0
Thus, dx/dR = -TXR/TX. < 0, when bR(R) ! 0, and may be either positive or negative when
b(R) > 0.
38. Recall that b(R) bh(bR)db, from note 32, supra.
39. Thus, t2(R ) =J t2g(t2,R)dt2.
40. Proof of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. Both follow directly from the observation that
the level of x that satisfies equation (5), note 33, supra, remains unchanged when b(R) replaces
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Proposition 4. The firm undertakes the same level of innovative effort
under either uncertainty or certainty about the level of benefit flow.
Proposition 5. The firm expects the same profit under uncertainty as
under certainty about the level of benefit flow.
These statements are possible because the firm is assumed to be risk neutral.
4
1
Of course, if the firm knew in advance that the actual benefit flow would dif-
fer from the mean, b(R), then the firm would prefer certain knowledge to a
state of uncertainty. But absent such knowledge, the innovative effort of the
firm is not affected by uncertainty about the level of benefit flow.
Finally, we turn to the effect of uncertainty about regulatory delay on the
level of innovation. Since timing is an important aspect of innovation,
particulary if the firm incurs costs of coordination that arise if the actual time
of regulatory delay differs from the expected length of the delay, one might
expect that the firm would prefer to operate with certainty rather than uncer-
tainty. If these coordination costs are high enough, then the firm would pre-
fer certainty to uncertainty.
However, the following two propositions point out that a firm might not
always prefer certainty to uncertainty, particularly for the case in which no
such coordination costs are incurred. Using the uncertainty notion of Defini-
tion 2, it turns out that, absent coordination costs, the firm would prefer un-
certainty about the length of regulatory delay. Further, the firm would under-
take a higher level of innovative effort under uncertainty because the
expected profit level under uncertainty exceeds the expected level under cer-
tainty.
Proposition 6. Without coordination costs, the firm innovates more un-
der uncertainty than under certainty about the length of regulatory
delay.4
2
J bh(b,R)db. Similarly, the value of T in equation (3), note 32, supra, is not affected.
41. For a discussion of risk neutrality, see note 28, supra. X
42. Proof: Let t2(R) be as defined in note 39, supra. By Jensen's Inequality,/ e-"2 g(t2,R)dt2
0
> e-r 2 R). Using equation (6), note 33, supra, let p A (x) be the value of x when t, is known to be
t2(R). Let x~solve
p 
A (x) = l/{(L + b(R))e 2(R) -L}
Further, let 4) B(x) be the value of D(x) with uncertainty. Let xB solve
D (x) = 1/{(L+b(R))] e-'2 g(t 2,R)dt 2 - L}
0
Then F x) > F (x) for any x. Since 4')_(x) < 0, from note 33, su pra, then XA < XB.
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Proposition 7. Without coordination costs, the firm prefers uncertainty
to certainty about the length of the regulatory delay.4 3
Although these results may appear to be counterintuitive, they do corre-
late after reflection. To demonstrate, we construct the following example. As-
sume that an innovation has just been achieved, i.e., we have arrived at time
t. The annual benefit flow that will be realized when t2 is reached (after
regulatory delay has occurred and the innovation can be implemented) is
known to be $1 million. The regulatory delay is uncertain, but the firm as-
sumes that it will be one year, two years, or three years with an equal proba-
bility of one-third in each case. There are no coordination costs. For simplic-
ity, assume that L = 0, i.e., the procedural costs are zero. Then Table I
enables us to calculate the present value of the expected benefits of the inno-
vation, discounted to time t. Note that the present value of the expected ben-
efit of innovation is $8.22 million, when the discount rate is assumed to be 10
percent. For the case of certainty, we assume that t2 is known to equal the
mean (or average) value of delay of two years. But, as Table I shows, the ben-
efit corresponding to a delay of two years is $8.18 million, which is less than
the $8.22 million expected benefit for the case with uncertainty.
The reason for the preference for uncertainty is apparent. The firm is
willing to take a chance that the delay will be less than the mean since it dis-
counts earlier earnings to a lesser extent than later earnings. We reemphasize
that a certain knowledge that the actual delay would differ from the mean
may lead the firm to reverse its preference for uncertainty. However, absent
such certain knowledge, and with small or no coordination costs, the firm may
actually undertake an R&D project with uncertainty about the regulatory de-
43. Proof: We first note that equation (5), note 33, supra, implies that T at X, (which we de-
note by T(XB)) is larger than T at XA (which we denote by T(xA)), i.e., T(xB) > T(xA) for XA XB-
Further, for any (x,t 2 ) combination, define v(x,R,r,L;t 2) to mean the value of the innovation given
any t2 , where




t2t2(x,R,r,L;t 2) = r
2[L+b(R)] ( e - F(t 1,x)dt 1)e-r2 > 0.
0
By Jensen's Inequality, T(xA) > v(xAR,r,L; t(R))
Thus T(XB) > T(XA) > v(xA,R,r,L;t2(R)).
Using this method of proof', by direct extension it follows that Propositions 6 and 7 hold for both
risk neutral and risk preferring firms, and for some risk averse firms. However, for a strong
enough aversion to risk, the preference for a firm would switch to certainty.
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
TABLE I
EXPECTED BENEFIT OF INNOVATION: EXAMPLE
[Vol. 43: No. 1
Regulatory Probability of Delay Present Value of
Delay (Years) of Column 1 Benefits at t, Col (2) X Col (3)
(1) (2) (3)4 (4)
1 1/3 $9.05 million $3.02 million
2 1/3 $8.18 million $2.73 million
3 1/3 $7.41 million $2.47 million
Present value of expected benefit = $8.22 million
lay length that it would not pursue if it knew in advance that the delay would
be the mean of the distribution.
VI
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed a formal model of regulatory delay and drawn a num-
ber of conclusions. Several of these conclusions correspond to widely accepted
concepts about the effect of the regulatory process on innovation. Higher
discount rates, higher costs of engaging in the administrative process, and
longer regulatory delay all serve to reduce the amount of R&D under-
taken by the regulated firm. Increased intermodal competition has ambiguous
effects on incentives for innovation. Uncertainty about the level of the benefit
flow does not affect incentives for R&D for a risk neutral firm. Finally, uncer-
tainty about the length of regulatory delay may actually increase incentives to
innovate, particularly if coordination costs are small.
In an effort to focus on the effects of regulatory delay, we have made a
number of simplifying structural assumptions that suggest directions for fur-
ther research. One possible direction for research would be to expand the
scope of the model to investigate broader questions about market equilibrium,
44. The present value of the benefit for each year is calculated for each entry in column (3)
as follows, using the procedure of CHIANG, note 20, supra, at 456-59.
Delay (Years) Present value of benefit, discounted to t,
1 ($1 million) e rtdt = $9.05 million
2 ($1 million) e-"dt = $8.18 million
2
3 ($1 million) Je rdt = $7.41 million
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in the same manner that Loury and Lee & Wilde have extended the analysis
of Kamien and Schwartz. 45 Such a model would explicitly include the threat
of innovation by other firms competing with any given firm. It would also re-
quire a structure to replace the parametric resistance parameter R in this pa-
per, as well as a more detailed representation of the decision mechanism used
by regulators in determining the benefits allowed and the length of regulatory
delay. While these issues are beyond the scope of this paper, the basic struc-
ture presented here could prove helpful in those efforts.
LEGEND
t, - time when innovation will occur
t, - length of regulatory delay
R - parameter representing resistance to innovation
b - net benefit flow from innovation, measured in dollars
T - present value of expected profits resulting from effort
to innovate, measured in dollars
r - discount rate
L - procedural cost flow, measured in dollars
45. Citations to the contributions of Kamien & Schwartz, Loury and Lee & Wilde are found
in notes 1 and 2, supra.
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